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LETTER FROM Under-Secretaries-General

Dear delegates,

It is our pleasure to welcome you all to the 3rd annual edition of Ipekcilik International Model United Nations 2019. We are Ayşe Elif Şahiner and Vildan Kanalci, will host and help you during the committee of the Security Council as your Under-Secretaries-General's. We are students in Ipekcilik Anatolian Imam-Hatip High School. It is really exciting to be able to meet you all. We hope our committee will be a fruitful and unforgettable experience for all of the delegates with your great attention. If you need or want to ask anything please do not hesitate.

Also, we want to thank our head Zeynep Sökücü for her great work and cooperation.

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Security Council

United Nations

The United Nations Charter established six main organs of the United Nations, including the Security Council. It gives primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security to the Security Council, which may meet whenever peace is threatened.

The Security Council held its first session on 17 January 1946 at Church House, Westminster, London. Since its first meeting, the Security Council has taken permanent residence at the United Nations Headquarters in New York City. It also travelled to many cities, holding sessions in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in 1972, in Panama City, Panama, and in Geneva, Switzerland, in 1990. A representative of each of its members must be present at all times at UN Headquarters so that the Security Council can meet at any time as the need arises.

The Security Council is the United Nations most powerful body, with "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security." Five powerful countries sit as "permanent members" along with ten elected members with two-year terms. Since 1990, the Council has dramatically increased its activity and it now meets in nearly continuous session. It dispatches



military operations, imposes sanctions, mandates arms inspections, deploys election monitors and more.

KEY WORDS

Continental Shelf

A continental shelf is the edge of a continent lying beneath the ocean. This shelf extends from the coastline of a continent to a drop off point called the shelf break. The shelf break is where the underwater edge of a continent shelf begins to rapidly slope downwards towards the ocean floor depths. From the break, the shelf descends into the deep ocean floor in the form of a continental slope, according to National Geographic Education (NGE). Though beneath the water, continental shelves are still part of their respective continents. Therefore, their edges define the actual boundaries of the earth's continents, not the visible coastlines.

a) Size of a continental shelf

According to the U.S Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, waters in continental shelves are rarely over 500 feet deep, compared to open, deeper ocean waters. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea stipulates that every nation's continental shelf over which they have exclusive economic sovereignty shall not be exceeding 200 nautical miles from any given nation's coastline. Widths of continental shelves vary, but their average width is 40 miles before giving way to deeper open ocean waters.

Coastal Water

In International Law the term territorial waters refers to that part of the ocean immediately adjacent to the shores of a state and subject to its territorial jurisdiction. The state possesses both the jurisdictional right to regulate, police, and adjudicate the territorial waters and the proprietary right to control and exploit natural resources in those waters and exclude others from them.



Territorial waters differ from the high seas, which are common to all nations and are governed by the principle of freedom of the seas. The high seas are not subject to appropriation by persons or states but are available to everyone for navigation, exploitation of resources, and other lawful uses. The legal status of territorial waters also extends to the seabed and subsoil under them and to the airspace above them.

Cross-referencesIn International Law the term territorial waters refers to that part of the ocean immediately adjacent to the shores of a state and subject to its territorial jurisdiction. The state possesses both the jurisdictional right to regulate, police, and adjudicate the territorial waters and the proprietary right to control and exploit natural resources in those waters and exclude others from them. Territorial waters differ from the high seas, which are common to all nations and are governed by the principle of freedom of the seas. The high seas are not subject to appropriation by persons or states but are available to everyone for navigation, exploitation of resources, and other lawful uses. The legal status of territorial waters also extends to the seabed and subsoil under them and to the airspace above them.

Exclusive Economic Zone

An exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is an area which is beyond, and is adjacent to, a given country's territorial seas, and extends no more than 200 nautical miles (370 kilometers) out from a country's own coastlines. It can be seen that if the area for EEZ is overlapped and it is still less than 400 nautical miles, then it falls upon the respective states to delineate the actual boundaries of the coastlines. The area which is under the EEZ of a state gives them full rights to explore and exploit the marine resources in its adjacent continental shelf.

a) Country-by-country examples

There are many countries which have their own exclusive economic zones. Some examples for a few such countries are described below:

Australia: It stands third in the matter of area which comes under EEZ area, and is behind the countries of the United States of America and France and leads in this regard over Russia. Its area extends to 200 nautical miles from its



coastline to the external maritime territories. It was also allotted an area of 2.5 million square kilometers in the Australian seabed.

Canada: The area covered under the Canadian EEZ includes the marine waters of Hudson Bay, the Gulf of Saint Lawrence, and the water areas of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago.

United Kingdom: The country has the fifth largest EEZ area of 6,805,586 square kilometers, and this also includes the zones of Crown Dependencies and British Overseas Territories.

Economic, Defensive, & Scientific Significance

The EEZs have also got economic importance as they do not only set the boundaries, but are also the source of livelihood for many countries because of their fisheries, natural gas reserves, and tourism. Even the shipping of goods also takes place through these zones from many other countries. The scientific importance of EEZs includes the carrying out of scientific research on varied marine creatures, and the sampling of the seabeds for oil and natural gas purposes which can also be carried out therein. Every country has been given the right to safeguard their territorial waters, but if some countries wish to explore the resources, then they have to enter into a bilateral agreement with the respective neighboring country.





The General Information of Local Importance of East Mediterranean

East Mediterranean Basin is a region which located between Asia and Europe as a location, and is large and fertile region. This region has approximately ten countries. (Turkey, Egypt, Israel, Cyprus, Syria, Lebanon, Greece, Libya, Tunisia, Fas, Algeria). Not only coast countries, but also the countries that want to gain energy cources of East Mediterranean have entered to this area These foreign countries are USA, UK, France, Italy, Germany, Russia, South Korea, China, Qatar. These sources are oil and natural gas reserves which makes this area so important and satisfies the percent of %30 of World gas and oil need. Energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean continue to determine the foreign policies of countries in the region. .The discoveries of hydrocarbon resources in the Eastern Mediterranean have raised the question of whether it will be a game changer in the region or not. According to the United States Geological Survey (USGS), the region could hold up to a total of 122 Tcf natural gas.¹ According to BP's 2015 data, global proven gas reserves are approximately 186.9 Tcm.² When compared at the global scale, on the one hand it can be seen that the region has a limited global impact. On the other hand, for the regional countries such as North and South Cyprus and Lebanon, which are primarily dependent on imported hydrocarbons for their energy production, regional discoveries will have a game changing impact. The Israeli experience of the past decade in terms of how increased natural gas production decreased Israel's dependence on imported hydrocarbons provides hints of what kind of a regional, geopolitical, economic and diplomatic game changing impact regional resources could have.

The East Mediterranean gas potential The surge of the East Mediterranean as a future gas-exporting region after the discovery of major gas fields in Israel (Tamar 2009; Leviathan 2010), Cyprus (Aphrodite 2011) and Egypt (Zohr 2015) is a fairly recent concept, which is subject to change due to uncertainty over the actual gas reserves and thus the difficulty of evaluating the financial viability of their full exploitation. Virtually all of the future gas development projects must be carried out in the framework of regional cooperation, since none of the Eastern Mediterranean countries – with the exception of Egypt – could afford to construct the necessary export infrastructure separately as a result of financial



restraints in relation to the size of individual gas reserves. The growth of gas demand in Egypt as well as the gas supply diversification strategies high on the EU agenda form the two main export trajectories of the Eastern Mediterranean gas. Both Israel and Cyprus expect to begin gas delivery around 2020, It has aimed not only to supply the domestic market but also for export. Supplying gas to Turkey (for its own demand as well as for transit), albeit potentially an economic option, is currently unlikely in the context of fractured political ties with practically all future gas producers of the East Mediterranean. At the same time, non-riparian countries are trying to establish dominance in the Eastern Mediterranean. In this context, the access to the energy resources that have rights in this region, especially Turkey also Northern Republic of Cyprus, is tried to be prevented by the countries that are not riparian and, even though they are in line against to these two countries (Turkey and Northern Republic of Cyprus). Even if Northern Republic of Cyprus is not accepted as a country by the UN and does not have the power to use and manage this energy, they act with Turkey because it is a riparian country. And in this process, Turkey is a country that has taken on responsibilities and defense on behalf of the northern Turkish Republic against to countries which do not accept Cyprus as country. The discovery of the Aphrodite gas field (about 200 bcm of estimated reserves²) in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of Cyprus in 2011 brought a wave of political enthusiasm fostering plans for the construction of an LNG export facility in Vassilikos, later dismissed due to insufficient gas reserves for the project's bankability. Doubts over the actual size of the field create an obstacle for designing an exploitation and export plan; however, even in case of as little as 90 bcm of actual gas reserves, Cyprus could satisfy its domestic gas demand (an estimated 0.7-0.95 bcm/year) for 20-30 years³ as well as exporting some of it to Egypt, which is currently viewed as the main future market for the Cypriot gas due to its size as well as geographical proximity. The risk of exporting gas to Egypt is its low domestic gas price, which could as a result incentivise Cyprus to divert its gas exports to Europe through the existing (albeit underused) LNG facilities of Idku and Damietta in Egypt in order to achieve a higher profit margin. Since Israel alone could not bear the costs (both financial and security-related) of building an LNG terminal, the potential export options for the Israeli gas reserves (likely in combination with the Cypriot gas supplies) from both the Tamar (8 bcm annual gas flow and 280 bcm reserve⁴) and in particular the Leviathan (620 bcm⁵) fields are Turkey, the EU and Egypt. However, the decades-long Turkish-Cypriot conflict is preventing the construction of a gas



pipeline to connect the Leviathan field with Ceyhan in Turkey, since the pipeline would have to cross the EEZ of Cyprus. The export of Israeli and Cypriot gas to the EU gas market through pipelines connecting in Greece is unlikely in the short to medium term due to extremely high construction costs involved in relation to the supply expected. Rapidly growing gas demand in Egypt, as well as the recent discovery of the Zohr field, which has increased the total national gas reserves to 2,180 bcm⁶ – significantly more than the Israeli and Cypriot reserves put together – makes Egypt the major regional player in the gas sector and the potential catalyst of the Eastern Mediterranean gas hub. In addition to exploiting its own natural gas resources, Egypt is likely to start importing gas from the Cypriot and Israeli gas fields by 2020, which could partly offset the current expensive spot-market LNG imports, which Egypt needs in order to satisfy its domestic demand. In light of continuing gas exploration in the Mediterranean, potential discoveries in the Greek as well as the Lebanese EEZ are possible too. This would of course shift the plans for the region's gas exports, however not without addressing the political obstacles of designing the export routes first. Gas discoveries in Israel and Cyprus are likely to push Turkey to resume peace talks with the island-country, in order to reap some of the benefits of the Eastern Mediterranean gas supplies and as a result diversify from dependence on Russian gas.





The General Information of Political Importance of East Mediterranean

Offshore drilling in the Eastern Mediterranean has a rather short history. The first offshore gas discovery was made in 1969 in Egypt (34 km northeast of Alexandria). A new wave of interest developed after a handful of modest gas discoveries occurred in 1999 and 2000 at shallow depths west of the coastal town of Ashkelon in Israel and Gaza Strip. These successes accelerated exploration efforts resulting in three large scale discoveries: Tamar and Leviathan fields in 2009 and 2010 offshore Israel and Aphrodite in 2011 off the coast of southern Cyprus (RC). The next big discovery came in 2015 with the giant Zohr gas field in a deep offshore zone of the Mediterranean, off the coast of Egypt. And yet, the region remains one of the world's most under-explored or unexplored areas and has good prospects for additional gas, and perhaps oil, reserves. Two assessments by the United States Geological Survey (USGS) in 2010 –one on the Nile Delta and Mediterranean Sea sectors of Egypt, the other on the Levant Basin Province– indicated almost 10 trillion cubic meters of technically recoverable undiscovered gas potential in the region. To put this into context, Algeria's current proven gas reserves is about half of it. The above mentioned discoveries, the USGS assessment as well as the eye-opening resource potential estimates by Cypriot and Lebanese officials, have not only significantly augmented hopes for large natural gas potential in the East Mediterranean but also made it a fast rising favorite for international oil and gas companies.

The overlap of the strategic interests of the global and regional actor in a narrow geographical area inevitably leads to many disagreements. The intersectionality of some of the parcels that countries define as Exclusive Economic Zones makes it necessary to produce a solution through bilateral and multilateral negotiations in the context of international law. However, it is very difficult to reach the eastern Mediterranean energy resources to the global markets and to realize their commercial values before the region-wide military conflicts are ended and an atmosphere of peace and stability is established. In this context, especially the demand for natural gas 450 billion cubic meters of years, the European Union for the countries of great importance in terms of energy supply security and stable supply of energy resources to international markets on the agenda for delivery in the eastern Mediterranean there are three



situations : the first of these, under the sea and made the connection with the current pipeline in Turkey to reach the European markets; second, long-a submarine pipeline is laid to Europe via Greece transfer.; the third is the transporting natural gas to Egypt via a pipeline to Europe after it is liquefied in LNG plants. The most reasonable of these, in terms of cost and sustainability, is undoubtedly the creation of pipelines and a transport corridor through Turkey. However, for this corridor to be implemented, the Exclusive Economic Zone disputes between Turkey and the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus and the objections to the existence of US-Israeli companies will have to be overcome in some way.

BACKGROUND OF COUNTRIES

A) ISRAEL

Due to Turkey's geographical location and the pipelines passing through its territory, it was considered both a Sunday and a European exit point for natural gas to be extracted from the Tamar and Leviathan fields. However, the suspension of diplomatic and military relations with Israel has made this option difficult. Seeking alternatives, Israel agreed with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration on the East Med (Eastern Mediterranean gas Boat Line). Under the agreement, the pipeline would be delivered to Europe, following Cyprus, Crete and Greece, without stopping in Turkey.



Israel has also built a strong relationship with Greece and Cyprus. The three countries conduct joint military exercises and coordinate on security operations in the eastern Mediterranean.

They are also now collaborating to build a US\$7 billion gas pipeline from Israeli and Cypriot gas fields through the Greek island of Crete and into Italy, in order to feed other European countries. This plan will become even more profitable if more natural gas reserves are discovered through the ongoing gas exploration activities around Crete.

Gas has also opened the door to talks with Lebanon, a country Israel has historically been at loggerheads with. Officials from both sides have agreed to discuss their sea border in talks mediated by the US. Newly discovered Mediterranean gas fields can only be safely developed when there is no threat of war between the two sides.

So, clearly, Israel's offshore gas reserves are highly valuable to its economic and strategic concerns in the region. It has gone to great lengths to ensure its existing gas fields are secure as a result, and has also made agreements with Egypt and Jordan to sell surplus gas.



B) EGYPT

Egypt was an importer of natural gas as recently as 2016. But a massive discovery of gas in 2015, in the Zohr field off Egypt's coast by Italian energy firm Eni, could make Egypt the region's most important gas exporter and hub. Zohr is the Mediterranean's largest gas field and has since been developed, with production starting in January 2018.

At the same time, the Egyptian government is planning on launching 11 new gas projects and positioning itself as a regional hub for international gas trading and distribution. Meanwhile, the Egyptian army has upgraded its arsenal and training programme. Its all part of the government's plan to regain its strategic regional role that was lost due to the Arab Spring and the political crises that followed.

C) TURKEY

There have been no big gas discoveries made in Turkey's part of the eastern Mediterranean but it has sent ships into the coastal waters of Cyprus to drill for gas. Turkey says it will continue drilling for gas in these waters if the internationally recognised Greek Cypriot government does not accept a cooperation proposal put forward by Turkish Cypriots. In response, Cyprus and Greece issued an arrest warrant for any Turkish drill ships obstructing their gas operations, and the two countries have called on the EU to punish Turkey for its actions. Turkey's brinkmanship must be understood in the context of attempts by Egypt, Greece, Cyprus and Israel to create a regional energy architecture that will exclude Turkey from the eastern Mediterranean natural gas market. Agreements between Egypt and Cyprus would lead to the sale of gas from the eastern Mediterranean to Europe, bypassing Turkey and Russia's pipelines.



Turkey's Policy In the Eastern Mediterranean

Turkey argues that in Cyprus, Turks have equal rights with the Greeks and should benefit jointly from the wealth of their devotes. Turkey states that it does not recognize the "exclusive economic zone" declared unilaterally by Gkry to countries such as USA, UK, France and Italy, and that Turkey will not permit exploration and production in areas that conflict with its maritime jurisdiction. Furthermore, Turkey informs its counterparts that it does not have the right to create and tender an exclusive economic zone, as it is not a state representing the entirety of the gkry. On the other hand, the Turkish Republic of northern Cyprus granted TPAO license areas in case the Greek Cypriot side could create an actual situation in the non-conflicting Northern, Eastern and southern parts of the island. Thus, he opposed the GKRY's declaration of exclusive economic zone by forming blocks, even though it did not represent the entirety of its dedication.

Turkey is actively engaged in drilling and exploration activities in areas called a,b,c,d,e,f,g, which are licensed by the TRNC with the Fatih drilling ship. These areas are within the exclusive economic borders of the TRNC. In addition to Fatih, Turkey's second drilling ship, Yavuz, also reached the region.



The Turkish Foreign Ministry, the Greek Conqueror drilling ship employees and the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) cooperates with foreign companies on news that the managers of a warrant out for his arrest on June 10 in a statement, "by ignoring and usurping the rights of the Turkish Cypriots by Greek Cypriots moving out of the line and make the decision if it is true no provision will not have validity for us." said Ministry spokesman Hami Aksoy said in a statement, "if he has the audacity, no one should doubt that we will give the necessary answer."

D) CYPRUS

Cyprus has been a bright spot for exploration, with a string of giant gas discoveries in recent years. These include ExxonMobil's Glaucus in 2019 and Eni's Calypso fields in 2018. There's also the more developed Aphrodite plot, which was discovered in 2011 and is projected to have a net revenue of US\$9.5 billion over 18 years from selling gas through Egypt's Idku terminal. But Cyprus is a divided state. The Greek side, the Republic of Cyprus, is the only side that is internationally recognised and, as a result, has sovereignty over the island's territorial waters and exclusive economic zone, which is the neighbouring sea area that a country has rights to. The northern, Turkish side, however, lays claim to gas in these waters and is getting support from the Turkish government in its efforts.

Since 2002, the Republic of Cyprus has started to enter into special economic zone (MEB) agreements with Lebanon, Syria and Israel, especially Egypt and other riparian countries in the Eastern Mediterranean. In 2007, Cyprus announced 13 exploration sites in the eastern Mediterranean, which it claims are its own, and began licensing to major oil companies. Most of the countries that are licensed for natural gas and oil exploration are not far from the Mediterranean and coastal countries in most of them. Thus, countries that are too far away as Mediterranean beaches began to claim their rights in the Mediterranean.

It was announced that a special consortium of EU member Republic of Cyprus, France's TOTAL and Italy's ENI would be allowed to carry out drilling works on the 7th parcel of Cyprus' Exclusive Economic Zone.




Yorgos Lakkotripis, yesterday, the Council of Ministers of 50 percent of the two companies announced the decision to grant shares.

a) Historical events

In the second half of the 16th century, the Greeks lived on the island that passed to the Ottoman Empire. As the number of Turkish society is increasing, their settlements have spread all over the island.

The island, which reached the 19th century, was given to the use of England, which persuaded Russia for a certain period of time from the Ottoman Empire without moving away from the Russian exposures. In 1960 it gained its independence. It consisted of Greeks and the leading Turkish Cypriot had emigrated to Anatolia.

Greeks on the island wants to continue in union with Greece but with the desire not across Turkey and the Turkish communities on the island. However, as a result of the events found in the 1974 military intervention by Turkey a candidate for the title of the guarantor states.





E) FRANCE

It is located very far from the Mediterranean coast of eastern France, even to this region. However, he is trying to carry out activities in this region with the granting of a license like other countries and his wish to take advantage of the kaynkalara in the Mediterranean.

France is extending its defence cooperation agreement with the Republic of Cyprus (Cyprus) to exist in the Eastern Mediterranean. The French government has drafted a draft law on the updated version of the defence cooperation agreement signed between the two countries in 2007.

The defence cooperation agreement between the two countries, signed on 28 February 2007, came into force in 2010. However, in 2014, when the hydrocarbon controversy erupted in Cyprus, the Greek Cypriot administration proposed that the agreement be expanded and updated to many areas, particularly energy security. After nearly three years of talks between the two sides, an updated version of the agreement was signed by then French Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian and his Greek counterpart Christoforos Fokaides in Paris on April 4, 2017.

The current agreement focused mainly on the training and equipment of the Greek Armed Forces by the French. The updated version of the agreement brings two key innovations. The first envisages energy security, maritime security, early warning, evacuation of French nationals from Near Eastern countries in the event of a Crisis, Crisis Management, response to terrorism, piracy and attacks from outside, and exchange of information and assistance in natural disasters. Secondly, it is based on “facilitating” and “improving logistical support” for the armed forces (especially the French armed forces).

a) strategic accounts of france

Here's the key to the updated deal. France is anchoring in the Eastern Mediterranean with this new agreement. From the perspective of Paris, the deal could be considered a strategic plan to shoot a few birds with one stone. The Near East is a priority for France. Having a say in solving problems in the region is one of the main axes of French foreign policy. 25 thousand French nationals live in Lebanon and 55 thousand in Israel. France, which has special relations with the Arab world, is the country with the most support after the United States for military operations against terrorist organizations in Iraq and Syria. It



therefore needs a permanent military presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. Post-Brexit Britain has doubts about the extent to which its military bases in Cyprus will be kept open to EU countries. Finally, he accounts for the share of energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Former Foreign Minister Ioannis Kasulides has openly admitted that his country is working on a joint naval base project with the French in Mari. Monday (February 4th), French ambassador to Cyprus René Troccaz visited the Evangelos Florakis naval base in Mari and the Andreas Papandreou Air Base in Paphos, confirming the plans between the two countries. It is said that the Mari base, which is not suitable for the docking of warships such as frigates and aircraft carriers, will be enlarged with Greek-French joint financing and will be opened to the permanent use of France without being defined as a “French base”.

F) UNITED STATES

United States as a location is a very far country from the eastern Mediterranean. however, as the Greek Cypriot Republic granted licenses to many countries, the United States also had the right to research and extract oil and gas there. in other words, as it is understood from here, America claims the energy resources in the eastern Mediterranean and is there with its military units on it.

a) the u.s. strategy in the eastern mediterranean

Russia, taking advantage of the power vacuum created in Syria by the Obama administration, began its military intervention in Syria in 2015 following a request from the Damascus regime. It soon became clear that the preservation of the Damascus regime was not the only purpose of Russia in Syria, and Kremlin had strengthened the military presence of the Russian military in the Eastern Mediterranean via new area denial capabilities (A2/AD). The U.S. also soon determined that Russian presence in the Eastern Mediterranean could pose a threat to the energy and security belt Washington intended to create in the region. Moscow brought the balances against the U.S. interests in the region into equilibrium through two main foundations by playing its cards right and at the



same time avoiding excessive actions that may prompt the U.S. to increase its presence in the region: The first of these has been the Astana cooperation process between Iran, Turkey and Russia concerning Syria. And the second is the continuation of good relationships with countries such as Egypt and Israel that lie in the new WFacing this new strategy focused on the Eastern Mediterranean developed by Moscow, Washington brought a series of military measures into action to avoid the erosion of U.S. hegemony in the Mediterranean. Through strengthening the sixth fleet, the U.S. increased the presence of its navy in the Mediterranean and led military exercises in the region via NATO. It also supported GCASC and Greece to conduct a series of commercial and military actions infringing on Turkey's and TRNC's legitimate rights in the Mediterranean. Ultimately the U.S. conducts its strategy of pressuring Russia, which it recognizes as a rival in the Mediterranean basin, through a plan which prioritizes pressuring countries in the region that cooperate with Moscow. As it is known, pressure is being applied on Iran through direct sanctions and by taking away the benefits of the 2015 nuclear agreement (if there were any) from Tehran. Turkey on the other hand is being pressured into abandoning its military and trade cooperation with Moscow through economic and military threats and via a psychological war conducted through supporting other countries and actors in the region.ashington-supported Mediterranean belt.

b) u.s.a. sanctions

Turkey's delivery of Fatih and Yavuz drilling vessels to Cyprus and the start of natural gas exploration in the region with the permission of the TRNC caused the reaction not only of the EU, Southern Cyprus or Greece, but also of Egypt, Israel and the United States. Similar sanction voices were also voiced, especially by the United States. The U.S. Senate Foreign Affairs Committee has decided to lift the arms embargo imposed by the United States on Southern Cyprus since 1987.

- Agreed to provide \$ 5 million for military assistance and training to Greece and \$ 2 million for military training to Southern Cyprus.
- Israel, Greece and G. The 'US-Eastern Mediterranean Energy Centre' is being established to facilitate energy cooperation between Cyprus.



- U.S. in the Eastern Mediterranean, Greece, Israel and G.It will establish a strong and expanding network of relations with Cyprus in line with its national security interests.
- All measures and work will be carried out to deepen existing energy-related cooperation between these countries.

Tension Between US and TURKEY

Washington has long dreamed of a belt that extends from the Gulf to the Mediterranean, and from there to Greece and Southern Europe. The support given to Saudi Arabia and Egypt, U.S. recognition of the annexation of the Golan Heights from Syria by Israel, the negative developments in Libya, the unconditional support given to the East-Med cooperation, expression of wishes towards the inclusion of GCASC in NATO, and lastly the introduction of the bill named "Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act of 2019" proposing to lift the prohibition of arms sales to GCASC to the U.S. Senate by U.S. senators Rubio and Menendez. All these recent developments indicate that the rivalry between the U.S. and Russia has reached a very serious dimension. The problem is that the U.S. is aware of the weaknesses of this belt, which it has worked loudly to build and support. While it trusts Israel fully, Egypt and Greece are not only comparatively weak actors but also very eager to develop their relationships with Russia economically. Lebanon and Libya are not fully won, and Qatar never forgot the embargo of the "glowing orb." GCASC is not an actor that carries much weight militarily, and the only area it particularly shines in is raising tensions.

Just like the Rubio-Menendez proposals, the new doctrines of Trump may lead to Turkey behaving in the exact opposite of the desired manner due to their exclusionary nature. The U.S. has now put on its intimidating face and is acting as if it maintains a strategy lacking any weaknesses. But this mask failed to fully scare even Egypt. Egypt has already declared that it will not be a part of the "Arab NATO" that is of U.S. design. Greece, which is a member of the Mediterranean Natural Gas Forum, has already expressed that the position of Turkey in the Mediterranean cannot be ignored, albeit in a muted manner. In the end, Greece has other economic opportunities beyond East-Med which only stands to benefit Israel, and most of them go through Turkey. When considered rationally, Turkey, which has a perfect geographical position, should not be



ignored to ensure that the Mediterranean Gas Forum, which aims for European energy cooperation and security in the Mediterranean, can successfully be brought into life. The fact that the most advantageous paths for alternative natural gas pipelines going from the Mediterranean to Europe pass through Turkey cannot be denied. But the calculations of the U.S. regarding the geopolitics of the Mediterranean occur entirely in the political dimension, and due to this reason Washington only sees Moscow when it looks at the Eastern Mediterranean and suffers from a strategic blindness concerning any other matter.

For peace and stability in the Mediterranean, the knot in the Ankara-Washington relationship must be resolved, at least to some degree. The method with which this knot will be undone will undoubtedly affect not only U.S.-Turkey relationships but also relationships on the strategic level in the entire Eastern Mediterranean region and even beyond. Ultimately, the decision to solve this knot whether by postponing the purchase of the S-400s or going through with the purchase will be made by Ankara. And while this decision will be made by Ankara, Washington will also have to decide on whether it's willing to risk losing Turkey or not, because the ones that are willing to descend the iron curtain on the Mediterranean are not only determining their allies and rivals but are also attempting to set the rules of the game. And after bringing the region into disarray and hurting regional actors economically, they distribute a few million dollars via divisive proposals. Turkey will not allow this new iron curtain to descend on itself, and will not be a part of the belt of weakness created by the U.S.

A new cold war was not a development Ankara wished for, nor did Ankara wish for one to begin in the Mediterranean, but if there must be one Turkey will define its own role: the stabilizer of balances. Ankara will build the necessary capabilities for this on its own. And in this process whoever loses Ankara politically will start this struggle on the Mediterranean front with a great handicap no matter how much noise they may make.

- Then it will carry natural gas to Europe via the Balkans, back to back with the European Union. The United States will receive a large share of natural gas and energy wealth in exchange for its watchdog.



The Issues Which Must Be Resolved

- 1) Discussing about rights of the eastern Mediterranean riparian countries.

The eastern Mediterranean region is a region with 10 coastal countries. However, while the riparian countries of this region have the right to extract their own oil and natural gas, some global countries interfere their rights to exercise this right. This issue is one of the most important problem to be discussed within the committee. at the same time, the defence and debate of countries that have not only rights but claim rights but do not take part as coastal countries and research under the licenses granted by Southern Cyprus will also be discussed in this committee. In this regard, countries will seek their rights and will be advanced in this way.

- 2) Discussing about 13 regions parceled out by some countries in the eastern Mediterranean have been drawn up in violation of other countries, territorial waters, continental shelf and exclusive economic zone.

Starting in 2002, the Republic of Cyprus began to enter into Exclusive Economic Zone agreements with other riparian countries, Lebanon, Syria and Israel, mainly Egypt, in the Eastern Mediterranean. With these treaties, he divided the area he designated as the exclusive economic zone into 13 parcels. Southern Greece issued licenses for these plots, giving non-riparian countries the right to search for natural gas and oil. Currently, many countries in the eastern



Mediterranean region want to continue to work in the region, and some countries are demanding rights too.

RESOURCES

- <http://www.ekathimerini.com/243809/opinion/ekathimerini/comment/the-tension-in-the-eastern-mediterranean>
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